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Logical empiricism’s philosophy of biology
1934-1936 (Prague/Paris/Copenhagen):
With historical and political intermezzos
Gereon Wolters
University of Konstanz (Germany)
Résumé : Ce chapitre reprend, en l’enrichissant, un article antérieur sur la
philosophie de la biologie de l’empirisme logique, en en examinant les thèses
centrales telles qu’elles sont exprimées lors des rencontres de Prague (1934), de
Paris (1935) et de Copenhague (1936), rencontres décisives pour le développe-
ment du mouvement et son rayonnement dans le monde occidental. Je montre
que l’empirisme logique n’a pas contribué au développement de la philosophie
de la biologie, comme il l’a fait pour celui de la philosophie de la physique ou
des mathématiques. Les raisons de cet échec sont triples : 1o ) les empiristes
logiques n’avaient qu’une vague connaissance des sciences biologiques ; 2o )
ils se sont focalisés sur un cadre stérile (idéologique), l’antivitalisme et le
réductionisme, qu’ils prenaient pour la philosophie de la biologie ; 3o ) cela
les a empêchés de traiter des véritables problèmes de la biologie. Entre les
différentes sections de ce chapitre, j’insère des « intermezzos » qui replacent
différents protagonistes de ces rencontres dans un contexte plus large (la grande
guerre, les persécutions, le langage).
Abstract: I offer a revision (“reload”) of an earlier paper on logical-
empiricism’s philosophy of biology by locating its central theses in the
context of the international conferences of Prague (1934), Paris (1935), and
Copenhagen (1936), so important for the development of logical empiricism
and its spread in the Western world. My theses are that logical empiricism
did not contribute in the same way to the development of the philosophy of
biology, as it did, e.g., to the development of philosophy of mathematics or
physics. The reasons for this failure were: (1o ) logical empiricists were largely
ignorant of the biological sciences; (2o ) they concentrated on an unproductive
(“ideological”) framework (anti-vitalism, reduction) that they took to be the
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philosophy of biology; (3o ) this prevented them from dealing with actual
problems of biological science. Between the various sections of the paper,
I insert “intermezzos” that present several conference participants within a
wider historical context (i.e., the Great War, persecution, language).
1 Introduction1
J’estime que nous avons plus que personne des raisons d’être
reconnaissants à nos amis français d’avoir organisé ce congrès.
With these words Philipp Frank began his Allocution inaugurale to the Congrès
international de philosophie scientifique on September 15, 1935 in the Palais-
Royal in Paris.2
I think they also fit well eighty years later for the commemorative event at
Château de Cerisy, and I would like to thank the organizers of the conference,
as well as the editors of this volume, for all the work they have done, not least
for graciously coping with the high bureaucratic standards of the marvelous
Château de Cerisy.
This paper is a revised edition of one published in 1999 [Wolters 1999].
In the meantime, many things have changed. Its central thesis, however, has
essentially remained the same: the logical empiricist philosophy of biology is
not exactly a success story—quite different from logical empiricism in general.
In my earlier paper, I called it a case of “wrongful life”. “Wrongful life” is one of
the peculiarities of the American legal system that cannot be digested without
difficulty for many people who grew up in Europe. Here is what Wikipedia
tells us:
Typically a child and the parents will sue a doctor or a hospital
for failing to provide information about the disability during the
pregnancy, or a genetic disposition before the pregnancy. Had the
mother been aware of this information, it is argued, she would
have had an abortion, or chosen not to conceive at all.3
1. The “intermezzos” serve to place our topic within a wider historical context
that the participants were most probably well aware of.
2. “I believe we have more reasons than anyone to be grateful to our French friends
for having organized this conference” [Frank 1936a, 13].
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wrongful_life, accessed February 28, 2016.
In Germany (and probably in other European countries), tort for wrongful life legal
actions are unconstitutional because they imply that the life of a disabled child is less
valuable than the life of a healthy one. This does not exclude, however, claims for
damages that result from elevated costs for the disabled child, in case of the doctors
or hospitals providing incorrect information.
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Notwithstanding my great sympathies, I do not regard myself as the legal
guardian of logical empiricism. I would rather like to stick to philosophical and
historical analysis. My thesis is that early logical empiricism—as it presented
itself at the conferences at Prague (1934), Paris (1935), and Copenhagen
(1936)—failed to develop a healthy philosophy of biology, understood as the
philosophical analysis of the presuppositions, structure, and consequences of
biological science. There is, however, a proviso with respect to this negative
assessment. Logical empiricists were aware of their shortcomings and showed
plenty of goodwill. One even notices significant improvements over the course
of those three years between Prague and Copenhagen. In my view, the major
congenital defects of logical empiricism’s philosophy of biology are:
1. the wrong people dealt with it,
2. an unproductive (“ideological”) framework was understood as the
philosophy of biology, which, finally,
3. prevented actual problems related to biological science from being dealt
with.
Intermezzo I – Paris 1935 – An outstanding
conference
At this point, I would like to insert into my argument the first of a few
intermezzos in order to digress a bit from the sad topic of “wrongful life”
and place Paris 1935 within a general historical context. The Paris Congress
of 1935 was, in my view, the greatest congress ever in the philosophy
of science. Two factors make Paris stick out: the first is that it took
a whole preliminary conference to prepare: the “Vorkonferenz des Ersten
Internationalen Kongresses für die Einheit der Wissenschaft”4 in Prague from
August 31 to September 2, 1934. The second factor that makes Paris stick out
is the extraordinary scientific quality of the participants. It somehow reminds
me of the Solvay Conferences in theoretical physics.5 Even at first glance,
the program of the Vorkonferenz is awe-inspiring.6 I guess that quite a few
readers of this paper are acquainted with the people on the program at Prague:
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Jørgen Jørgensen,
Charles W. Morris, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, Jan Łukasiewicz, Alfred
Tarski, and Edgar Zilsel. We, furthermore, know that there were others
around, but not on the program, among them Maria Kokoszyńska, Janina
4. “Preparatory Congress for the First International Congress for the Unity of
Science”, [Erkenntnis 1936a].
5. A good overview can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solvay_
Conference (accessed June 4, 2018).
6. [Erkenntnis 1935c, 2]. There we also find the other names mentioned here, with
the exception of Karl Popper.
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Hosiasson-Lindenbaum, Ernest Nagel, Moritz Schlick, and Karl Popper.7 In
addition to preparing Paris there was a second motive for organizing the
Prague Vorkonferenz, namely, as (probably) Neurath put it: “to acquaint the
representatives of the various tendencies” of what he called “anti-metaphysical
empiricism” [Erkenntnis 1935c, 1]. This seems to have worked out nicely:
Carnap, who taught at Prague University at that time, notes in his diary with
a great sigh of relief at the end of the International Philosophy Congress, which
followed the Vorkonferenz:
Finally, day of rest. [...] On the occasion of the Congress,
were invited to our place and came: Łukasiewicz and his wife,
Neurath, [Carl Gustav] Hempel and Eva, Jørgensen and his
wife, Ajdukiewicz, Tarski, Hosiasson, Frau [Marja] Kokoszyńska,
[Eino] Kaila, Schlick, [Felix] Kaufmann and his wife, and [Kurt]
Grelling. Invited but did not come: the Franks, [Louis] Rougier,
Reichenbach, [Roman] Jakobson.
Nicely enough, Carnap also notes those whom he had not invited:
Åke Petzäll and his wife, [Karl] Menger, Neider, Ms Fraenkel [wife
of Abraham Fraenkel], [Paul] Hertz, [Ernest] Nagel, Dürr, Morris
(but he was invited earlier), Smith, Zilsel, Popper (met him for
lunch), [Leo] Strauss, [Walter] Hollitscher (met him before briefly
in an afternoon), Meiner, [Arne] Naess.8
Unfortunately, Carnap does not reveal what his invitation criteria were.
We meet almost all of the Prague people and many more a year later in Paris.
Have a look at the Paris participant list (in alphabetical order) [Erkenntnis
1935b], [Stadler 2015, 366–371]
7. Karl Popper reports that he took the page proof of the Logik der Forschung
(rewritten in English by the author as The Logic of Scientific Discovery) with him to
Prague [Popper 2012, 126]. There he discussed his rejection of induction, particularly
with Janina Hosiasson, who “could not believe that anybody could seriously argue
against induction”. The contributions of Hosiasson, Ernest Nagel and Moritz Schlick
at the International Congress of Philosophy that followed the Vorkonferenz were
published in Erkenntnis 5 (1935), together with the papers of the Vorkonferenz.
8. “Mo, 10.09.1934. Endlich Ruhetag [...] Bei Gelegenheit des Kongresses waren
bei uns eingeladen und gekommen: Łukasiewicz und Frau, Neurath, Hempel und
Eva, Jørgensen und Frau, Ajdukiewicz, Tarski, Hosiasson, Frau Kokoschińska, Kaila,
Schlick, Kaufmann und Frau, Grelling. – eingeladen, aber nicht gekommen: Franks,
Rougier, Reichenbach, Jacobson. – nicht eingeladen: Petzäll und Frau, Menger,
Neider, Frau Fraenkel, Hertz, Nagel, Dürr, Morris (aber früher), Smith, Zilsel, Popper
(aber vorher mittags), Strauß, Hollitscher (vorher einen Nachmittag kurz), Meiner,
Naess” [PAUK, RC025-75-12]. [Unless otherwise stated, all translations of quotes
that appear within this essay are my own.]

























































































(* The papers of Brunswik and Schlick were read to the audience, because
the authors “were unable to appear personally”). [Erkenntnis 1935d, 379]
Have you heard of any big conference in the philosophy of science with
some eighty speakers, and so many first-rate people among them? Or, to put
it differently, can you imagine a meeting commemorating the commemorative
conference at Cerisy eighty years from now, in 2095. Would people be likely
to know one quarter to half of the participants at Cerisy through their own
work?
This is the end of Intermezzo I. We will now return to wrongful life and
the first congenital defect of logical empiricism’s philosophy of biology.
2 The wrong people
Checking the programs of the Prague, Paris, and Copenhagen conferences
confirms the impression of readers of the 1929 Manifesto of the Vienna Circle.
The leading figures of early logical empiricism had their scientific background
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in mathematics or physics, or—in the case of Neurath—in economics. Nobody
had studied, or seems to have been particularly interested in, biology. No
member of the inner circle of logical empiricism9 was to any extent aware
of the epistemological and methodological problems that had arisen, e.g.,
in the context of genetics or evolutionary theory. While logical empiricists
in physics and mathematics were the philosophical avant-garde, they knew
next to nothing about biology. What they actually talked about in a sort
of biological context (vitalism and reductionism) was rather irrelevant for
understanding contemporary biological research.10
I would like to emphasize, however, that early logical empiricists were
aware of their shortcomings with respect to biology and soon started to search
for help outside their circle. At the Prague Vorkonferenz, the philosophy
of biology was practically still inexistent. Not even one of the twelve or so
talks dealt with it.11 For the main event in Paris, however, the Vorkonferenz
gives the programmatic promise that there “the logical foundations of the
Wissenschaften in their entirety [emphasis mine] should be treated, and not
only those of mathematics and physics”.12 This promise seems to have
been taken seriously, indeed. Hardcore empiricists of the mathematical-
physical persuasion suddenly started dealing with the topic of biology: in the
summer semester of 1935, at the University of Prague, Carnap, together with
Frank, launched a Colloquium on the “Philosophical Foundations of Natural
9. At the hard core of the Circle, I count from Vienna: Rudolf Carnap, Herbert
Feigl, Philipp Frank, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, and Edgar Zilsel; from Berlin:
Carl G. Hempel and Hans Reichenbach, and several of the Polish allies, among them
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Janina Hosiasson, and Alfred Tarski. One should note,
however, that the Berliners had, remarkably, opened up to people from medicine
and psychology [cf. Stadler 2015, xxvii].
10. There is a rather bewildering criticism of my 1999 paper in [Nicholson & Gawne
2015]. On the one hand, the authors, who have a favorable view of organicism, claim
“to show that logical empiricism and vitalism were of minimal importance to the
philosophy of biology during the first half of the twentieth century” [Nicholson &
Gawne 2015, 347]. On the other hand, they quote me as a “representative example”
of the following view: “early philosophy of biology has regularly been dismissed as
futile because it has been associated with [...] a discredited research program [i.e.,
logical empiricism]” [Nicholson & Gawne 2015, 348]. In my 1999 paper as well as in
the present one, I show, indeed, that logical empiricism was of minimal importance
to the philosophy of biology. However, I do not speak out about “early philosophy of
biology in general, nor do I associate “early philosophy of biology” exclusively with
logical empiricism. I simply give a critique of the logical-empiricist approach and
nothing else. I am grateful to Jean Gayon (Paris) for pointing out the [Nicholson &
Gawne 2015] paper to me.
11. Strangely enough, there was a section called “Physics, Probability, Biology” [cf.
Stadler 2015, 357]. Zilsel’s “Jordan’s Attempt to Save Vitalism through Quantum
Mechanics” was probably regarded as belonging to “Biology”.
12. “Die logischen Grundlagen des Gesamtgebietes der Wissenschaften sollten
behandelt werden, nicht nur die der Mathematik und Physik” [Erkenntnis 1935c,
1].
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Science” [Grundlagenfragen der Naturwissenschaften], the first part of which
was intended to deal with “Physics and Biology”.
Second, Carnap, Neurath, and others tried to involve biologists in the Paris
conference. Here are a few quotes:
Neurath to the organizing committee for Paris (“The Five”)13 on March 6,
1935:
It would be important to get biologists and so on, Woodger and
so on.14
Carnap to Neurath on May 10, 1935:
Please, get in contact with Dr. J.H. Woodger [...] because of his
talk on biology. He has declared his readiness.15
Neurath to “The Five” on May 28, 1935:
Morris thinks that more biologists and sociologists would be
desirable on the big committee. He proposes J.H. Woodger (he
will give a talk!!!), J. B. S. [John Burdon Sanderson] Haldane,
Joseph Needham.16
Finally, Neurath to Carnap on July 15, 1935:
On the whole we must strive to give priority to more concrete
problems. Frank complains much that there is so little about
special sciences. Not even physics. Therefore, Woodger should
be at the very beginning and give a plenary talk, and together [?,
meaning unclear, G.W.]. If Woodger is good, then this is, finally,
something new. Biology in logistic packaging. That must not get
lost in a special session.17
Neurath’s program also mentions a talk by the Swiss physicist Charles-Eugène
Guye (1866-1942), one of Albert Einstein’s teachers at the Swiss Polytechnic
13. “The Five” were: Carnap, Frank, Neurath, Reichenbach, and Rougier
[Erkenntnis 1935a, 299].
14. “Es wäre wichtig, Biologen usw. zu bekommen, Woodger, usw.” [PAUK,
RC029-11-75].
15. “Bitte setze Dich mit Dr. J.H. Woodger [...] wegen seines Biologievortrags in
Verbindung. Er hat sich dazu bereit erklärt” [PAUK, RC-029-09-56].
16. “Morris meint, mehr Biologen und Soziologen erwünscht im großen Komitee.
Er schlägt vor J.H. Woodger (Er wird einen Vortrag halten!!!!). J. B. S. Haldane,
Joseph Needham” [PAUK, RC029-09-51].
17. “Im Ganzen müssen wir uns bemühen, die konkreteren Probleme in den
Vordergrund zu schieben. Frank klagt sehr, dass so wenig Einzelwissenschaftliches
kommt, usw. Nicht einmal Physik. Daher soll Woodger vorn sein und gemeinsam [?].
Das ist – wenn Woodger tüchtig ist – endlich mal was Neues. Biologie in logistischer
Aufmachung. Das darf noch [doch?] nicht in einer Sektion untergehn” [PAUK,
RC029-09-24].
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Institute in Zurich, entitled “On the Transition from Physical Chemistry to
Biology”. There are, however, no indications that this talk was ever given.
A look at the actual program18 shows that, of the roughly eighty talks
and comments of the Congress, exactly three deal with biology. The first
of these was Philipp Frank’s “The Divide between Physical and Biological
Sciences, Seen in the Light of Modern Physical Theories”.19 The talk given
by Pierre Lecomte du Noüy (1883-1947), a mathematician and biophysicist,
was “On the Unity of Method in the Comparison of Physical and Biological
Sciences”,20 and, finally, Joseph Henry Woodger’s talk was on “An Axiom
System for Biology”. As is well known, Philipp Frank had become professor of
physics in Prague in 1912 on the recommendation of Einstein as his successor.
To the best of my knowledge, this is Frank’s first dealing with biology.
Off to Copenhagen! Between June 21 and 26, 1936, the Second
International Congress for the Unity of Science took place. Its topic was “The
Problem of Causality—With Special Consideration of Physics and Biology”.21
That “biology” appeared in the title of the Congress was a step forward, of
course. In addition, the personnel had clearly improved. The first speaker
was the most colorful English biologist J. B. S. Haldane (1892-1964), who was
inter alia one of the pioneers of the mathematical theory of evolution and of
population genetics. Second, the Russian-American scholar Nicolas Rashevsky
(1899-1972), one of the founders of mathematical biology, and, third, Georges
Matisse (1874-1961), a more encyclopedic mind with a background in physics,
who had already given a talk on philosophical pseudo-problems in Paris,22 and
whom we will encounter shortly in a rather different context.
Intermezzo II – Philosophers at war
In 1915, twenty years before the Paris Conference, several participants lay
in the trenches of World War I and tried to kill each other. Carnap, for
example, had already enlisted during the first days of the Great War and
proudly notes in his diary on August 10, 1914: “medical examination [...]
accepted with the artillery.”23 A year later and one-hundred years before the
18. Cf. [Stadler 1997, 406–412]. Stadler reproduces the program as given in the
tables of contents of the volumes of the [Actes 1936]. Strangely enough, the important
talk of Joseph Henry Woodger is missing there. It is mentioned, however, in both
the program that Neurath published before the Congress and in his report about it
in [Erkenntnis 1935b,d, 295, 385].
19. Read in French: “L’abîme entre les sciences physiques et biologiques, vu à la
lumière des théories physiques modernes.”
20. Also read in French: “Sur l’unité de la méthode dans les sciences physiques et
biologiques comparées.”
21. Cf. [Stadler 2015, 372ff.]. A collection of talks and summaries is in [Erkenntnis
1936a, 275–450].
22. Published in [Actes 1936, 41–49].
23. “Untersuchung [...] bei der Artillerie angenommen” [PAUK, RC025-71-06].
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Cerisy commemorative conference we find Carnap, in September 1915, on drill
in the Riesengebirge, a mountainous area, now part of the Czech Republic. On
September 1, he notes: “I strongly feel like joining a machine gun course.”24
His enthusiasm, however, is marred by the fact that he had messed up a course
for becoming a lieutenant, and still had to serve as a sergeant [Oberjäger ]:
In the evening in the “Brown Stag” again all lieutenants; feel very
well among them, cordially grant them their good fortune, are
nice to me. But I cannot get rid of the secondary object that I,
too, could be where they are.25
A few days later he writes:
The ill feeling about the other lieutenants has gone, but I feel very
unsatisfied. [...] It’s high time that I get to the battlefield.26
A year later, in September 1916, Carnap finally became a lieutenant. He
was now in the trenches of Verdun [PAUK, RC025-71-12-1], and might have
shot at French philosophers. By early 1918 at the latest, however, Carnap had
become a pacifist. He was ordered by his commander [PAUK, RC089-72-03
(September 11, 1918)] not to send any more circulars to his friends like the one
entitled “German Defeat—Senseless Fate or Guilt”. There one reads among
other things:
That state of mind in Europe, which rendered the Great War
inevitable and until now its termination impossible had its
principle breeding ground in Germany. [...] I can here only briefly
point to Germany’s attitude at the Hague conferences,27 and the
hatred of the other peoples that resulted from this attitude; to the
indifference and the ridicule, compared to other peoples, of our
public opinion with respect to what happened at the Hague; to
the weeks prior to the outbreak of the war; to the beginning of the
year 1917, when the submarine war foiled the initial approaches
to peace; to January 1918 with Wilson’s peace program and the
military rule in Berlin. At latest now, in the context of the current
24. “Ich bekomme große Lust zum MG Kursus” [PAUK, RC025-71-08].
25. [PAUK, RC025-71-08]: “Abends im Braunen Hirsch wieder alle Leutnants;
fühle mich sehr wohl unter ihnen, gönne ihnen das Glück herzlich, sind nett zu mir.
Ich kann aber den ständigen Nebengedanken nicht loswerden: so weit könnte ich jetzt
auch sein” (September 5, 1915).
26. [PAUK, RC025-71-08]: “Die Missstimmung über die anderen Leutnants bin ich
los, aber fühle mich doch sehr unbefriedigt. [...] Es wird höchste Zeit, dass ich bald
ins Feld komme” (September 12, 1915).
27. Carnap relates here to the first and second Hague conferences (1899 and 1907).
During these two conferences, a number of states achieved conventions about laws of
war, peaceful settlement of disputes, and so on. The German Reich played a rather
destructive role, particularly in the context of disarmament.
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constitutional reforms, everyone must recognize how much in our
country martial points of view were superior to political ones.28
For Carnap, it took a war to make him an anti-militarist. Reichenbach, in
contrast, had already been an anti-militarist prior to the war. In March 1914,
the 23-year-old student published a remarkable article, entitled “Militarism
and Youth”:
What people with a healthy sense put off with respect to the
effects of this education system is the inner untruthfulness that it
nurses in young people, the dishonesty of the judgment about the
problems of modern politics and the social life, the self-conceit
of true national feeling that does not consist in crying hurrahs
and in the glorification of militarism. Rather it tries to express
itself in going to the bottom and in deepening the culture that
is characteristic of one’s own people. [...] Poor youth that throw
away, for playing soldier, the most beautiful right of young people,
i.e., having the possibility to live in a completely humane way!29
It would be very interesting to have reports about philosophers of science,
particularly on the French and British fronts. They almost certainly exist,
but, unfortunately, I do not know of any.
Overall, I have found that the young philosophers of science in Germany
showed comparatively little enthusiasm for the Great War [Wolters 2017].
During the war, we find no war propagandist among them. Nonetheless,
twenty years later, in Paris, one notorious German propagandist was among
the speakers. He was a convert to scientific philosophy. In 1915, however, when
Heinrich Scholz—who later became a logician—published three propaganda
28. [PAUK: RC089-72-04, 15]: “Die Geistesverfassung Europas, die den Weltkrieg
unvermeidbar und dann seine Beendigung bisher unmöglich machte, hat ihren
Hauptnährboden in Deutschland. [...] Ich kann hier nur kurz hinweisen auf
Deutschlands Haltung bei den Haager Conferenzen und den Hass der anderen Völker
als Folge davon; auf die Gleichgültigkeit und den Spott unserer öffentlichen Meinung
gegenüber dem, was im Haag geschah, im Vergleich zu den anderen Völkern; auf
die Wochen vor Ausbruch des Krieges, auf den Anfang des Jahres 1917, als eine
schon begonnene Anbahnung zum Frieden durch den U-Bootkrieg zunichte gemacht
wurde; auf den Januar 1918 mit den Ereignissen des Wilson’schen Friedensprogramms
und der Berliner Militärherrschaft. Spätestens jetzt bei den Verfassungsreformen
dieser Tage müssen doch jedem die Augen darüber aufgehen, wie sehr bei uns der
kriegerische Gesichtspunkt dem politischen übergeordnet war.”
29. [Reichenbach 1914, 1237ff.]: “Was den gesund Empfindenden an der Wirkung
dieses Erziehungssystems abschrecken muss, das ist die innere Unwahrhaftigkeit,
die hier in der Jugend großgezogen wird, die Unehrlichkeit des Urteils über die
Probleme der modernen Politik und des sozialen Lebens, die Verblendung des wahren
Nationalgefühls, das nicht in Hurrageschrei und Verherrlichung des Militarismus
besteht, sondern in der Ergründung und Vertiefung der dem Volke eigenartigen Kultur
seinen Ausdruck sucht. [...] Arme Jugend! Die das schönste Recht der Jugend, ganz
Mensch sein zu dürfen, hergibt, um Soldat zu spielen!”
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brochures, he was still a protestant theologian. Moreover, in 1917, when a
fourth such pamphlet followed, he received a chair in systematic theology at
Breslau, now the Polish Wrocław. Incidentally, I also found that at least one
of the French participants at Copenhagen, Georges Matisse—given the titles
of his brochures—seemed to be a propagandist, but only at first glance. In
1915, he published Les Allemands – destructeurs de cathédrales et de trésors
du passé [The Germans – Destroyers of Cathedrals and Treasures of the Past],
a title that invites comparisons with the so-called Islamic State or the Taliban
these days. The other brochure was explicitly addressed to the Germans: Aux
Allemands: pourquoi n’êtes-vous pas aimés dans le monde? [To the Germans:
Why Does the World Not Like You?] [Matisse 1915]. Unfortunately, both
brochures remained untranslated and, thus, reached only a small number of
their addressees.30 This is the all the more regrettable because truthful Allied
reports about German Islamic-State-like activities in Belgium and Northern
France were denounced in Germany as enemy propaganda. The other brochure
is an analysis by the self-confessed Germanophile Matisse31 of the rise of a
feeling of superiority among German elites that sounds, indeed, very fitting
to me, having read dozens of war talks and manifestos by German professors.
Matisse correctly qualifies the unrealistic German feeling of superiority that
these papers exhibit as a prejudice [préjugé] and rightly summarizes that
“Nothing deforms judgment more than patriotism. Patriotism is a religion.
As with every religion, it promotes unsympathetic attitudes, intolerance, and
exclusivity”.32—These days we see, by the way, a similar disproportion between
hyperbolic self-assessments and sad reality, for example, in large parts of the
Islamic world or in Russia.
I know of only two self-confessed pacifists among European philosophers.
Both were close to scientific philosophy: Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat.
Russell, who at Paris was arguably the most prominent participant, went to
jail for his fight against compulsory military service, while Couturat was—on
30. In German Public Libraries, I could not trace a single copy of the first, and
only two of the second.
31. Cf. [Matisse 1915, 11ff.]: “Lorsque je vins, il y a une vingtaine d’années, en
Allemagne, je fus séduit par le charme des petites villages du centre de la Thuringe,
qu’entourent des collines boisées d’une beauté sobre et intime. La vie qu’on y menait
alors, l’accueil bienveillant des habitants, leur amabilité souriante, leur bonne grâce
familiale m’inspirèrent une sympathie profonde pour le peuple allemand, et pour son
caractère dans ce qu’il a de foncier. Elle n’est pas éteinte depuis. Quelques amis ne
me le pardonnent guère aujourd’hui.” – [“I have traveled in Germany for about twenty
years now, and have been ravished by the charm of the small villages of the center of
Thuringia that surround sylvan hills of sober and intimate beauty. The life one led
then, the benevolent reception of the inhabitants, their smiling amiability, and their
nice gemuetlich grace inspired in me a deep sympathy for the German people and for
what is at the bottom of their character. It has not dissolved since. Some friends
hardly forgive me for that.”]
32. [Matisse 1915, 18]: “Rien ne déforme plus le jugement que le patriotisme. Le
patriotisme est une religion. Comme toute religion il rend incompréhensif, intolérant,
exclusif.”
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August 3, 1914—among the first civilian victims of war. The French Wikipedia
notes: “his vehicle was hit, indeed, by a vehicle that carried the mobilization
orders of the French army.”33 By 1915, Russell had, in fact, already given a
short evaluation of the Great War that I find to be the best I have ever seen:
This war is trivial, for all its vastness. No great principle is at
stake, no great human purpose is involved on either side.
[Hoeres 2004]
3 Wrong (“ideological”) framework
With logical empiricists, there tends to be a curious terminological insecurity
with regard to providing a precise label for the work they do. This insecurity,
which I am going to document here from the Prague Vorkonferenz, is
an indication of divergent ideas of what the whole movement was about.
Neurath, the tireless organizer of unity, regards “anti-metaphysical empiri-
cism” as the mantra that should bind together the “various tendencies”.
Charles W. Morris speaks of “scientific empiricism” and later of “scientific
philosophy”, which Hempel, in his German summary, translates as “wis-
senschaftliche Philosophie” [Erkenntnis 1935c, 149]. Neurath is happy to adopt
“scientism” [Szientismus], and two lines later uses “logicizing empiricism”
[logisierender Emprismus]. Ajdukiewicz speaks of “scientific world perspec-
tive” [wissenschaftliche Weltperspektive] and in another paper of “logistic
anti-irrationalism”; Carnap distinguishes the wider Wissenschaftslehre, i.e.,
something like present day science studies, from the narrower, discipline-
related logical analysis of science [Wissenschaftslogik].34 However, in the
correspondence that Neurath conducted in preparing Paris, the “Unity of
Science” seemed to become the expression that was intended to unite the
movement. In fact, the German title of Paris is “Erster Internationaler
Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft”, while the addition to that title
in French is “Congrès international de philosophie scientifique” [Erkenntnis
1935a, 300]. In Copenhagen, Erkenntnis gives only the German “Einheit der
Wissenschaft”. [Erkenntnis 1936b, vi, 137]. At later congresses, the English
“Unity of Science” became the label.
Unfortunately, Morris and Carnap could not establish their terminological
ideas. It seems fair to regard “anti-metaphysics” and “unified science” as the
key labels for most logical empiricists in the 1930s. For the Berlin branch,
however—as seems also to have been the case in Poland—anti-metaphysics
was not of primary concern, while it was a philosophical cornerstone for
33. “[...] sa voiture fut en effet heurtée par la voiture portant les ordres de mo-
bilisation de l’armée française”, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louis_Couturat,
accessed October 10, 2014.
34. [Erkenntnis 1935c, 1 (Neurath I); 6 (Morris I), 142 (Morris II); 16 (Neurath II);
16 (Neurath III); 22 (Ajdukiewicz I), 151 (Ajdukiewicz II); 30 (Carnap)].
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many in Vienna. In Berlin, anti-metaphysics resulted, as it were, from well-
conducted philosophy of science, while in Vienna things worked the other
way round.35 However, the difference in rank and emphasis that the battle
against metaphysics took on in Berlin and Vienna, respectively, does not
seem to have been discussed explicitly between the two centers. Berlin had
no objection to anti-metaphysics, and Vienna was not disappointed in that
regard as long as Berlin delivered intellectual arms and contributed, with
its infrastructure, to the dissemination of the scientific world-conception as
an antidote to metaphysics. Anti-metaphysics, in the context of biology,
meant excluding from living nature every possibility of teleology, or action
of non-mechanical, and therefore possibly divine, forces. This means that
anti-metaphysics, in the context of philosophy of biology, relates to none other
than the good old mechanism vs. vitalism controversy.
Unified science, in turn, basically meant the reduction of biology to physics.
Physics is the model of empirical science. I think that this backward-looking
job description of philosophy of biology, i.e., anti-metaphysics and reduction, is
responsible for more than three decades of stagnation of logical empiricism in
this important philosophical field. In other words, problems alien to biological
science determined the agenda for philosophy of biology. One can note,
however, nonetheless, during the three years between Prague and Copenhagen,
a growing dissatisfaction among the protagonists and the demand to approach
biology in a different way.
Intermezzo III: Cruel fates
Paris 1935 was not only a congress that united people of unusual excellence.
Unusual would also be an apt description for the cruel fate that awaited a
large number of the participants. To talk only about those whose biographies
I know sufficiently well, 10 years after Paris, in 1945, at the end of World
War II, the following people had fled the occupied parts of Europe: Brunswik,
Carnap, Leon Chwistek, Frank, Heinemann, Hollitscher, Lecomte du Noüy,
Oppenheim, Popper, Tarski, Zilsel. Others, such as Enriques, had to hide,
while Heinemann, Hempel, Neurath, and Reichenbach were, in 1935, already
refugees from Germany and Austria, respectively.
The first to be murdered was Schlick, who in 1936 was shot by a
psychologically-disturbed student, whose crime was certainly favored by the
Viennese clerico-fascist environment, hostile to enlightenment-oriented logical
empiricism.36 Grelling, Lautman, Janina Hossiasson-Lindenbaum and her
husband Adolf Lindenbaum were murdered in German concentration camps
or directly by the Gestapo.
35. Cf. the self-presentation of the two groups in [Erkenntnis 1930, 72–74].
36. Stadler gives a fascinating documentation of the case. The murderer received
a ten-year sentence [Stadler 2015, 869–909]. By 1938, however, he had already been
released from jail.
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Imagine the idea that ten years from now about 20 percent of the
participants at the Cerisy conference were to become emigrants and some
were to be murdered.
4 No contemporary problems of biological
science
I mentioned earlier that the Paris organizers had identified biology as a field
to be given special consideration. The first step in this direction was the
colloquium “Physics and Biology”, organized by Carnap and Frank at Prague
University during the summer semester of 1935. It started on March 18, 1935
with Frank, who talked about “What do the new theories of physics mean for
boundary questions between physics and biology?”37 Unfortunately, we do
not know anything about the content of the talk. It most likely did not differ
very much from what Frank said in Paris a few months later.
On May 27, 1935 Carnap himself gave a talk on “The Relations
between Biology and Physics: From the Point of View of the Logic of
Science” [Die Beziehungen zwischen Biologie und Physik, vom Standpunkt
der Wissenschaftslogik] in the context of his Prague lecture series “System
der Wissenschaft”. According to Carnap’s notes for this lecture, it is the
“task of biology: explanation of processes in living bodies through compilation
of biological laws [...] that have to be added to the physical laws in order
to explain the processes in living bodies”.38 The relationship between the
entire disciplines of physics and biology is hence reduced to the “relationship
between biological and physical laws”.39 Carnap sees two possibilities to
formulate this thesis: First, “all biological concepts are via definition reducible
to physical concepts [...]. Thus: all concrete statements and all laws of
biology can be formulated in a physicalist language”.40 Second, “possibility of
deduction”. Whether biology may be deduced from physics is for Carnap
an “open question”. In any case, he is convinced: “Today not possible:
37. Carnap notes: “Heute Referat von Frank: ‘Was bedeuten die neueren Theorien
der Physik für die Grenzfragen zwischen Physik und Biologie?’ Frank trägt gut vor”
[PAUK, RC025-75-13]. – [“Today Frank’s talk: ‘What do the new theories of physics
mean?’ Frank performs well”].
38. “Aufgabe der Biologie: Erklärung der Vorgänge an lebenden Körpern durch
Aufstellung der biologischen Gesetze [... d.h.] Gesetze, die zu den physikalischen
hinzukommen werden müssen, um die Vorgänge an lebenden Körpern zu erklären”
[PAUK, RC110-07-07].
39. “Beziehung zwischen Biologie und Physik = Beziehung zwischen biologischen
und physikalischen Gesetzen” [PAUK, RC110-07-07].
40. “[...] alle biologischen Begriffe sind durch Definitionen zurückführbar auf
physikalische Begriffe. [...] also: alle konkreten Sätze und alle Gesetze der Biologie
sind formulierbar in einer physikalistischen Sprache” [PAUK, RC110-07-07].
Logical Empiricism’s Philosophy of Biology 247
particular biological laws. Whether possible later we do not know.”41 After
some polemics against Hans Driesch’s neo-vitalism, Carnap takes a clearly
physicalist position:
I do not attach importance to the terminological question (“biology
is a branch of physics”). [...] My thesis is simply: the relationship
of biology to the physics of the non-living is analogous to the
relationship of the theory of electricity to the physics of the non-
electrical.42
In short, Carnap’s talk doesn’t provide a great deal of philosophical analysis
regarding biological science; rather, he presents the usual anti-vitalist and
reductionist theories that characterize early logical empiricism, as we have
already seen. Carnap and the others simply could do no better because they
did not understand sufficiently well what contemporary biology was about.
Perhaps Carnap did not even understand what his biology colleagues said. In
his diary, Carnap notes:
Mo, 27.05.1935. Dentist—5 lecture. 7:15-9:30 colloquium. My
talk ‘The relations between biology and physics, from the point
of view of the logic of science’. [the plant physiologist Ernst]
Pringsheim and [the botanist Adolf Alois] Pascher agree overall.
[The plant physiologist and historian of science Josef] Gicklhorn
has reservations against “too much physics”, but formulates them
very unclearly.43
In searching for actual topics related to the philosophy of biology, I have
checked the entire volumes of Erkenntnis in order to ascertain whether
evolution is dealt with. I have only found one article by the botanist
Walter Zimmermann (1892-1980), who writes about the topic of evolution
[Phylogenie], which is so central to both biology and philosophy of biology.
On a couple of pages, Zimmermann contrasts morphology in a “phylogenic”
perspective with idealist morphology [Zimmermann 1937, 25ff.].
In the biology section in Paris there were talks by Philipp Frank (1884-
1966), Pierre Lecomte du Noüy (1883-1947)—a biophysicist who, at the time
41. “Heute nicht möglich: eigene biologische Gesetze. Ob später einmal möglich,
wissen wir nicht” [PAUK, RC110-07-07].
42. “Auf die terminologische Frage (‘Biologie ist Zweig der Physik’) will ich nicht
Wert legen [...] Meine These ist nur: Verhältnis der Biologie zur Physik des
Nicht-Belebten analog dem Verhältnis der Elektrizitätslehre zur Physik des Nicht-
Elektrischen” [PAUK, RC110-07-07].
43. “Mo, 27.05.1935 Zahnarzt. 5 Vorlesung. 7:15 – 9:30 Colloquium. Mein
Vortrag ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen Biologie und Physik, vom Standpunkt der
Wissenschaftslogik’. Pringsheim und Pascher sind im ganzen einverstanden.
Gicklhorn hat Bedenken wegen ‘zu viel Physik’, formuliert sie aber sehr unklar”
[PAUK, RC25-75-13].
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of the conference, acted as head of the biophysics division of the Institut
Pasteur44—and J.H. Woodger (1894-1981).
It would be an exaggeration to say that the three talks could be considered
as contributions to the philosophy of biology on a par with those made to the
philosophy of physics or mathematics. Frank rejects positions that invoke
Niels Bohr’s interpretation of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in
order to claim “that there exist in biological science laws of a spiritualist,
holist, or organicist sort instead of the laws that are used in physical science
to determine observed phenomena.”45 Rather, the task is “to explain life in
a mechanistic way”.46 Lecomte du Noüy’s talk “On the unity of method in
physical and biological sciences compared to each other” is, in my view, the
most interesting. Unlike Frank, he warns against adopting physicalism in
biology, and hints at what was later called “supervenience”. He summarizes:
I hope to have shown [...] one of the essential differences between
problems posed by living matter, by organized beings and by
raw matter. The ultimate elements are identical. One might
imagine that the analytical method pushed to the extreme would
be necessary and sufficient to deliver answers to all our questions.
[...] It seems, on the contrary, however, that the biological problem
superposes itself at a certain level of complexity on the physical
and chemical problem. It seems that the analysis is incapable
of connecting the teachings obtained beyond a certain threshold
with those the biological methods disclose on this side.47
Woodger, the great hope of the organizers, turned out to be a failure.
He presented his unworldly idea of axiomatizing biology. Carnap, who had
promoted his invitation, notes disappointedly in his diary on September 16,
1935: “far too difficult, he speaks without the slightest empathy for the
poor audience.”48 In fact, poor Woodger’s talk was, for whatever reason,
44. The English Wikipedia entry (unlike the French one) is very informative.
Cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pasteur_Institute, accessed June 4, 2015.
45. Philipp Frank, “L’abîme entre les sciences physiques et biologiques vu à la
lumière des théories physiques modernes”, in [Actes 1936, 3]: “qu’il y ait dans les
sciences biologiques des lois de caractère spiritualiste, totalitaire ou organiciste au
lieu des lois qui interviennent pour régir les phénomènes observés dans les sciences
physiques.”
46. [Frank 1936b, 1]: “expliquer la vie de façon mécanique.”
47. “J’espère avoir montré [...] une des différences essentielles entre les problèmes
posés par la matière vivante, par des êtres organisées et par la matière brute. Les
éléments ultimes étant identiques, on pouvait imaginer que la méthode analytique
poussée à l’extrême était nécessaire et suffisante pour fournir les réponses à toutes nos
questions. [...] Il semble bien, au contraire, que le problème biologique se superpose,
à un certain degré de complexité, au problème physique et chimique, et que l’analyse
soit incapable de relier les renseignements obtenus au-delà d’un certain seuil, à ceux
que les méthodes biologiques lui révèlent en deçà [Lecomte du Noüy 1936, 13].
48. “[...] viel zu schwierig, spricht ganz ohne Einfühlung in das arme Publikum”
[PAUK, RC025-75-13].
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not published, and not even summarized in the proceedings of the Paris
Congress.49
Overall, the promise, given in Prague, to deal with “the logical founda-
tions” of biology as well, was far from being fully kept in Paris.
Off to Copenhagen again! Were things there better for the philosophy of
biology? The short answer is, yes, to some extent. As mentioned already, there
were three talks in the biology section at Copenhagen: J. B. S. Haldane (1892-
1964), Nicolas Rashevsky (1899-1972), and Georges Matisse (1874-1961). Let
us start with Matisse. He could not come to the Congress, but his talk was
read to the audience. It aimed at rejecting finalistic approaches in biology by
pointing to the fact that in inorganic systems one already finds what Matisse
calls “structures orientées”. Here is one of his examples:
When an electric current passes through a solution, all metallic
ions of a mineral salt in solution direct themselves towards the
cathode, and the radicals toward the anode.50
Similarly, living systems should be seen in the context of a theory of
structurally-ordered systems that display a regular order of their material
components, often combined with a special direction of their elementary
processes.51
Haldane’s and Rashevsky’s talks are just reports of what is going on in their
respective fields. In the case of Haldane, this is population genetics, while
Rashevsky explores the possibility of using physico-mathematical methods
in biology, in particular on the level of single cells and functional groups of
cells. While Haldane hardly mentions any philosophical problem, Rashevsky
at least makes clear that the use of mathematical methods in biology requires
49. J.H. Woodger [Woodger 1937] probably gives a good idea of what he said in
Paris. [Nicholson & Gawne 2014] quote me as assuming Woodger’s “allegiance to
logical empiricism” [Nicholson & Gawne 2014, 247]. The only thing I say about
Woodger in my older paper is: “Woodger also can be regarded as related [my
emphasis] to logical empiricism. His Axiomatic Method in Biology [Woodger 1937]
certainly is an impressive piece of scholarly work, and it was praised in a review in
Erkenntnis. But it is unclear to me if Woodger’s rigorous axiomatization contributes
to a deeper understanding of real biological science” [Wolters 1999, 199]. That
Woodger, in some sense, was related to logical empiricism is clear. “Being related”
to something or someone is, at least according to my understanding as a non-native
speaker of English, different from “allegiance” to something or someone.
50. “Quand un courant électrique traverse une solution, tous les ions métalliques
d’un sel minéral dissous se dirigent vers la cathode et les radicaux vers l’anode”
[Matisse 1936, 370].
51. This is almost a translation of Carl Gustav Hempel’s summary in [Hempel
1936, 374]: “Der Verf. selbst vertritt die Auffassung, dass die Lebenserscheinungen
auf Grund einer Theorie der Systeme mit struktureller Organisation (d.h. mit
regelmäßiger Ordnung ihrer materiellen Bestandteile und häufig mit besonderer
Gerichtetheit der in ihnen stattfindenden Elementarprozesse) zu erklären seien.”
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idealization.52 In my view, Frank, in his closing remarks to Copenhagen, gives
a fair résumé:
At the Congress, Haldane has talked about genetics and
Rashevsky about the application of mathematico-physical meth-
ods in biology. We have invited these two researchers in order to
receive new suggestions for the search for the logical structure of
science that can be found in every purely scientific theory that is
free of metaphysics.53
In Frank’s view, the talks, thus, were less philosophical but offered rather
biological raw material for future philosophical analysis.
Briefly, from Prague, via Paris to Copenhagen, we see a sort of positive
gradient as to special problems in the philosophy of biology. It went from
zero in Prague, via old questions in Paris, to information about current
biological science that invited philosophical analysis in Copenhagen. In a
sense, the ground was now prepared to start a philosophy of biology inspired
by logical empiricism. It might well be due to political developments that one
still had to wait.
Intermezzo IV – Languages
We read about Paris in the report in Erkenntnis, probably written by Otto
Neurath:
Congress languages were German, English, and French. Single
speakers tended to use one congress language in one instance,
and another in a different instance. Others acted as translators
of their own talks. Bertrand Russell gave his warm obituary for
[Gottlob] Frege in German. For the rest, the talks were translated
in excerpt form as necessary, and only occasionally parts of the
discussion also.54
52. Cf. [Haldane 1936], [Rashevsky 1936]. Veronika Hofer praises Haldane’s
paper as “a paradigmatically clear paper about the use of mathematical models in
population genetics” [Hofer 2013, 354]. I have been unable to identify such models.
What one can find at best is the presentation in simple matrices of empirical results
about the connection of a certain property (e.g., intelligence) with certain genotypes
and environments.
53. [Frank 1936b, 448]: “Auf dem Kongress hat Haldane über Vererbungslehre
gesprochen, Rashevski über Anwendung mathematisch-physikalischer Gesichtspunkte
in der Biologie. Wir haben diese beiden Forscher eingeladen, um neue Anregungen
für das Suchen nach der logischen Struktur der Wissenschaft zu gewinnen, die man
in jeder rein wissenschaftlichen, von Metaphysik freien Theorie finden kann.”
54. “Kongresssprachen waren Deutsch, Englisch, Französisch, einzelne Redner
bedienten sich bald der einen bald der anderen Kongresssprache, einzelne traten als
Übersetzer ihrer eigenen Reden auf. Bertrand Russell hielt seinen warm empfundenen
Nachruf auf Frege in deutscher Sprache. Im übrigen wurden die Vorträge nach Bedarf
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Eighty years later, at the commemorative event at Cerisy, two of the Paris
languages have remained, while German has gone. At most other international
conferences nowadays, English is the only language. This is certainly a positive
development. Having a lingua franca is a great asset, and there can be no
doubt that English is the chosen language. In 1935, things were different.
On the European continent, at least in Germany, more people had a certain
knowledge of French than of English. After Prague, in late September/early
October 1934, Carnap made his first trip to England. His short notes in his
diary often relate to language: September 27, 1934: “Things are going very
well, linguistically. I speak quite slowly, however.” On October 2, 1934 he notes
about a lunch with the Woodgers and Russell: “Russell, occasionally, speaks
very good German. He proposes that I speak German and he English.” – A
bit later: “Partially very vivid conversation [of Russell] with Ms. Woodger,
too fast, so that I cannot quite follow.” – October 8, 1934: “My first talk
5:15 to 6:15. [...] In the beginning I read very slowly, look in-between at
the audience. Only at the blackboard, I speak briefly without notes. I make
an effort to pronounce distinctly; but it was possibly too slow.”55—People at
Paris, Prague, and Copenhagen were almost certainly in Carnap’s linguistic
position with respect to one or two of the congress languages.
The problems Carnap describes here are just one of the disadvantages
that English as a lingua franca carries with it for most people who do not
have English as their mother tongue. My paper here is just another proof of
this. Many more asymmetries result from the fact that, unlike Latin in the
Middle Ages, the academic lingua franca of our time is the first language in
a number of countries.56 I would like to make a counterfactual hypothesis:
if, these days, a philosophical movement like logical empiricism were to arise
outside the Anglophone world, in a language other than English, it would not
surface on the international level, because Anglophone, particularly American,
philosophy determines the topics of the international agenda, and—as a rule—
takes no notice of publications in other languages. This was different in
the 1930s, when Anglophone philosophers still knew foreign languages and
read publications in those languages. In addition, the tireless organizational
efforts of Neurath on an international scale, and, sadly, the emigration of the
leading minds to the U.S., made it possible for logical empiricism to flourish
internationally, not least in the U.S.
auszugsweise übersetzt, nur gelegentlich auch Teile der Diskussion” [Erkenntnis
1935d, 379].
55. “Es geht sprachlich sehr gut, aber ich spreche ganz langsam.” – “Russell spricht
zwischendurch sehr gutes Deutsch. Er schlägt vor, dass ich deutsch und er englisch
spreche. [...] Teilweise lebhaftes, zu schnelles Gespräch mit Frau Woodger, dem ich
nicht ganz folgen kann.” – “Mein erster Vortrag 51/4- 61/4 [...] Ich lese anfangs sehr
langsam, sehe dazwischen die Leute an; nur an der Tafel spreche ich kurze Zeit frei.
Ich bemühe mich, deutlich zu auszusprechen; aber es war wohl zu langsam” [PAUK,
RC025-75-12].
56. Cf. for a presentation of such asymmetries, e.g., [Wolters 2015].
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5 Conclusion
Prague, Paris, and Copenhagen show the achievements (or, more precisely,
non-achievements) of logical-empiricist philosophy of biology. In Erkenntnis,
for example, one finds a great number of outstanding and now classical papers
on philosophy of science. The only outstanding contribution to the philosophy
of biology, however, is in my view Kurt Lewin’s classic “The transition of the
Aristotelian to the Galilean mode of thinking in biology and psychology” [Der
Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und
Psychologie]. Ironically, right from the outset, this paper takes exception to
one of the pillars of logical-empiricist philosophy of biology:
I do not have the intention to infer deductively from the history of
physics in which direction biology “should” proceed. For I am not
of the opinion that there is, after all, only one empirical science,
namely physics, to which all others are reduced.57
In a footnote Lewin talks about “a thesis with respect to ’unified science’ ”,
put forward by Carnap, to which Lewin attests “an absolutely speculative
character similar to older conceptions. It satisfies as little the requirements of
considering the factual development of science as it does the requirements of
mathematics”.58
To sum up: in Erkenntnis, the key journal of the movement, logical em-
piricists themselves did not contribute any remarkable work to the philosophy
of biology. In addition, there does not seem to be any positive influence on
the work related to the philosophy of biology of those biologists, physicians,
and philosophers for whom logical empiricism provided a platform. The only
exception, Lewin, dissociates himself from a central logical-empiricist tenet.
Instead, it took another two to three decades (after Paris) before the great ideas
about the logical analysis of science that logical empiricism had inaugurated
would become fruitful for biology.59
57. “Ich habe nicht die Absicht, aus der Geschichte der Physik deduktiv zu
schließen, was die Biologie tun ‘soll’. Denn ich bin nicht der Meinung, daß es
letzten Endes nur eine einzige Wissenschaft, die Physik, gibt, auf die alle übrigen
zurückgehen” [Lewin 1930, 423].
58. [Lewin 1930, 423]: “In den klaren Arbeiten von Carnap zur mathema-
tischen Logik wird eine These über die ‘Einheitswissenschaft’ vertreten, die [...]
ähnlich wie die älteren Gedankengänge einen durchaus spekulativen Charakter
trägt und den Anforderungen einer ‘empirischen’ Berücksichtigung der faktis-
chen Wissenschaftsentwicklung ebensowenig genügt wie den Anforderungen der
Mathematik.”
59. This turn might arguably be connected with Morton Beckner’s [Beckner 1959].
I would like to thank my friend Peter Machamer (Pittsburgh) for calling my attention
to Beckner.
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